

Supervisory Control of Safety Critical Systems

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Outline and Objective

- **Outline**
 - Objective
 - Definitions
 - Reliability analysis
 - Supervisory control
 - Example
- **Objective**
 - Investigate the impact of control on fault-tolerance
 - An alternative view of fault tolerant control: supervisory control of failure processes

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Definitions

- A fault is an unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property or variable of the system
- A failure is a permanent interruption of a (sub)system's ability to perform a required function under specified conditions
- Reliability is the probability that a (sub)system will perform a required function for a given period of time when operated under stated operating conditions
- Reliability modeling for an N component system amounts to the determination of a structure mapping $\{0,1\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ where '1' means intact, and '0' means failed

Definitions

- A Markov process is a stochastic process for which the probability that a system will undergo a transition from one state to another depends only on the current state
- A holding time of a Markov process is a r.v. that represents the time the process stays at a particular state
- A Markov reliability model is specified by the three tuple

$$(\chi, p_x(0), \lambda_{x,x'})$$
- Supervisory control refers to the control of Markov process via transition rates, in particular,

$$c_{x',u}(t)\lambda_{x,x'}$$
- Coverage is the conditional probability that a system remains in operation given that a subsystem failure has occurred

Definitions

- A fault parameter space is a Euclidean space of real parameters that change their values as the result of some fault or subsystem failure occurrence
- Closed-loop control performance under control law u

$$J_u(\theta) = \frac{1}{\sup_{\|w\|_{in} \leq 1} \|T_{wz}^u(\theta)w\|_{out}}$$

- A control performance threshold $J_{th}(\theta)$ that distinguishes a normal from a failed operation of a controlled system
- Diagnostic resolution

$$R_\kappa = \frac{1}{\det(\kappa P)}, \mathcal{E} = \left\{ \theta \mid (\theta - \bar{\theta})' P^{-1} (\theta - \bar{\theta}) \leq \kappa \right\}$$

- A critical clearance time is the maximum period allowed between the occurrence of a fault or a subsystem failure and the establishment of a post-fault equilibrium which includes the departing trajectory from a pre-fault equilibrium in its ROA

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

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Reliability Analysis

- A reliability model for a flight control system

Reliability requirements:
 1-out-of-3 for inner layer
 1-out-of-2 for outer layer
 Coverage of failures:
 1st 3-plex failure: c_0^a
 2nd 3-plex failure: c_1^a
 3rd 3-plex failure: c_2^a
 1st 1-plex failure: c_0^b



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Reliability Analysis

States and transition rates for a degradable 2-layer 3								
normal state	trans. rate	state w. 1 failure	trans. rate	state w. 2 failures	trans. rate	state w. 3 failures	trans. rate	state w. 4 failures
30103010	$3\lambda_a c_0^a$	21103010	$2\lambda_a c_1^a$	12103010	$\lambda_a c_2^a$	03103010	$3\lambda_a c_0^a$	03102110
							$3\lambda_a \bar{c}_0^a$	03102110d
							λ_b	03103001d
					$\lambda_a \bar{c}_2^a$	03103010d		
					$\lambda_b c_0^b$	12013010	$3\lambda_a c_0^a$	12012110
							$3\lambda_a \bar{c}_0^a$	12012110d
							λ_b	12013001d
					$\lambda_b \bar{c}_0^b$	12013010d		
			$2\lambda_a \bar{c}_1^a$	12103010d				
			$\lambda_b \bar{c}_0^b$	21013010d				
			$\lambda_b c_0^b$	21013010	$3\lambda_a c_0^a$	21012110	$2\lambda_a c_1^a$	21011210
							$2\lambda_a \bar{c}_1^a$	21011210d

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Reliability Analysis

- Kolmogorov equation

$$\dot{P} = PQ, P(0) = I$$

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} q_{00} & q_{01} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q_{06} \\ 0 & q_{11} & q_{12} & 0 & 0 & 0 & q_{16} \\ 0 & 0 & q_{22} & q_{23} & 0 & 0 & q_{26} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & q_{33} & q_{34} & 0 & q_{36} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q_{44} & q_{45} & q_{46} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q_{55} & q_{56} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Resort to numerical tools and approximations
- An approximation and implication

$$P_D(t) = 6\lambda_a(1 - c_0^a)t + 2\lambda_b(1 - c_0^b)t$$


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Supervisory Control

- A two-level two-timescale model




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Supervisory Control



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Supervisory Control

- An optimal greedy policy

$$\max_u c_{\theta,u}(t_d), c_{\theta,u}(t_d) = \int_{\hat{\theta} \in \{\theta \in \Omega | J_u(\theta) \geq J_{th}(\theta)\}} f(\hat{\theta}, t_d | \theta) d\hat{\theta}$$

- More robust control law leads to higher coverage
- More stringent control requirement leads to lower coverage
- Higher diagnostic resolution leads to higher coverage
- The above policy minimizes system level failure probability

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An Example

- HIMAT aircraft
 - Focusing on controllable transitions
 - Landscaping and classification
 - Control performance
 - Diagnosis resolution
 - Coverage

